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Abstract 
Before effective anti-poverty policy can be designed and implemented, the extent, trend 
and distribution of poverty must be identified. In this sense, poverty measurement is a 
crucial intermediate step in public policymaking and development planning. This paper 
asks whether the estimated proportion of the world’s population with income below 
US$1 (adjusted according to purchasing power parity) per day is a good measure of 
trends in global poverty. We argue that the answer depends on two important issues in 
the measurement of poverty—the definition of the poverty line, and how best to 
summarize the level of poverty In this paper, we survey the literature on poverty 
measurement, demonstrate the importance of considering poverty incidence, depth and 
inequality jointly, present a simple but powerful graphical representation of the Sen and 
SST indices of poverty intensity (the poverty box) which is the FGT index of order 1 
and extend our empirical work to China using the commonly accepted international 
poverty line definition of one half median equivalent income. 
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One of the primary targets of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is the 
poverty rate or headcount ratio, i.e., the proportion of population with income below the 
US$1 poverty line. As a measure of poverty, this has the enormous advantage of 
simplicity. The poverty line—one US dollar per day—seems immediately 
understandable as an indicator of absolute deprivation. The calculation of the percentage 
of people who are poor is similarly straightforward. This measure can therefore easily 
be used in public debates—even though it implicitly embodies the assumption that the 
degree, and inequality, of deprivation of the poor is not important.  
According to the UNIDO International Development Report (2004), the proportion of 
the world population with income below US$1 (adjusted according to purchasing power 
parity)1 per day2 has dropped from 40 per cent in 1981 to 21 per cent in 2001. However, 
the question this paper asks is: is this alone a good indicator of global anti-poverty 
progress?  
A secondary indicator of MDGs is the poverty gap ratio (also called the average poverty 
gap of the population (see Xu and Osberg 2002: 140) or the poverty gap index (see 
Lipton and Ravallion 1995: 2579) which is the mean distance for the entire population 
of income shortfalls below the poverty line as a proportion of the poverty line (Chen 
and Ravallion 2001: Table 3). The poverty rate and the average poverty gap ratio3 are 
the two most used poverty measures in many countries and international organizations, 
largely because they can be easily understood and, as a consequence, actually used in 
the broader public debate.  
A third dimension of poverty measurement (although not calculated widely4) is the 
inequality of poverty. Although this is not part of the MDGs, economists such as 
Amartya Sen have argued for the use of poverty measures which jointly incorporate the 
incidence, depth and inequality of poverty. In this paper, we explore such possibilities, 
and possible simplifications.  
                                                 
1  Aten and Heston (2004) note that since the consumption of the poor is more heavily weighted to food 
than the consumption of the population as a whole, and since food is relatively high-priced in 
developing countries, the PPP adjustment appropriate for comparison of GDP per capita is 
inappropriate for comparisons of absolute poverty. They argue that a more appropriate poverty line 
PPP would substantially increase the global poverty rate. However, this issue is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
2   Chen and Ravallion (2001: 285) note that initially the US$1 per day standard was set in 1985 prices, 
but they use US$1.08 in 1993 prices. 
3  Two closely related poverty measures are the average poverty gap ratio of the population (where the 
deprivation of the nonpoor is taken to be zero—see Equation 2.3) and the average poverty gap ratio of 
the poor (or the income gap ratio), which is defined as the average income shortfall below the poverty 
line as the proportion of the poverty line for the poor—see equation 2.2 (see Lipton and Ravallion 
1995: 2579; Ray 1998: 255, and Xu and Osberg 2002: 140). Clearly, the average poverty gap ratio of 
the population equals the product of the average poverty gap ratio of the poor and poverty rate. 
4  The Philippines is one of the few developing countries which reports inequality regularly as a part of 
official poverty statistics.  
2 
Measures of the incidence, depth and inequality of poverty presuppose specification of 
the poverty line. In common language usage, poverty is about deprivation of necessities: 
the primary dictionary definition of ‘poverty’ is ‘want of the necessities of life’ (see 
Oxford 1998: 1135). However, any operational criterion for poverty measures 
necessarily involves some approximation in the measurement of individuals’ command 
over resources, and some balancing of the risks of misclassification. For any given 
poverty line, there is some probability that a person who is actually deprived may not be 
identified as a poor person (Type I error) and there is also some chance that a non-
deprived person may be identified as poor (Type II error)—minimizing these errors, in 
particular Type I error, is important. As well, analysts have often debated whether to 
measure poverty in terms of a generalized command over resources (i.e., income) or in 
terms of command over specific commodities, i.e., a minimum food and nonfood 
basket.  
A poverty line or threshold can be established based on either an absolute or relative 
criterion. Typically, an absolute poverty line has been used in developing countries, 
often based on the minimum food consumption basket for a specific level of calories 
(say 2200) and a minimum non-food consumption basket. However, economic growth 
means that even absolute poverty lines tend to change over time, as consumption items 
which were considered non-essential in the past, are considered essentials now. The 
rapid economic growth in recent years in some countries suggests that in this changing 
world, the absolute poverty line methodology may be becoming less appropriate in 
these countries.5 
In affluent countries, extreme deprivation may be rare, and in practice poverty research 
in most developed countries uses an explicitly relative definition of the poverty line6 
(often defined as a fraction, usually 50 per cent, of median income). An absolute 
poverty line (such as US$1 per day) has been more common in research on developing 
countries. However, some developing countries are very rapidly becoming more 
affluent—at least in average incomes. Hence, although many researchers would agree 
that absolute deprivation remains the important issue in countries with very low per 
capita incomes, this division of focus has become harder to justify in recent years. Rapid 
economic growth in countries such as China, Maldives, Thailand, and some others 
(comprising a large fraction of the world’s population) raises the question: how should 
we measure poverty when average income is growing rapidly? 
Amartya Sen (1985) has noted that there is the broader question of whether a poverty 
line income threshold can be representative of other dimensions of capacities. Also, at 
the operational level, researchers need to decide which measurement units to use. The 
recipient unit—individuals or households—must be defined and identified, as is 
culturally appropriate. Researchers must also decide whether income or consumption or 
                                                 
5  For example, in Maldives, Thailand, and some regions in China, no absolute poverty exists if the 
absolute poverty line were used in 2003-04.  
6  See, for example, the recent OECD study by Förster and Mira d’Ercole (2005). Even when the 
rhetoric of an ‘absolute’ poverty line is used, the redefinition over time of a ‘subsistence’ consumption 
bundle in developed economies often means that the poverty line is implicitly, if periodically, drawn 
relative to prevailing norms of consumption (see Fisher 1995 and Osberg 2000). The USA is an 
exception, since the social security poverty line initially set in 1963 at three times the level of a 
‘subsistence’ food budget has been adjusted only for price increases since then.  
3 
expenditure is the most appropriate concept to use in assessing command over resources 
and how exactly each concept can be best approximated in the real world of statistical 
practice. But given these research decisions, poverty still has to be summarized by some 
index—and one example of current practice is given by Chen and Ravallion (2001), 
who use the headcount ratio and poverty gap ratio based on the international absolute 
consumption poverty lines (the 1993 PPP-adjusted US$1.08 and US$2.15, respectively).  
In the economic literature, many poverty measures have been proposed primarily based 
on the axiomatic approach advocated by Sen (1976).7 However, most are not actually 
used in practice. The more communicable and often-used poverty measures are the 
headcount ratio, poverty gap ratio, income gap ratio, and Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) 
indices of different orders. (See Lipton and Ravallion 1995; Ray 1998, and Todaro and 
Smith 2003.) Although perhaps desirable from a theoretical perspective, more complex 
poverty measures such as the Sen and SST indices that measure poverty incidence, 
depth and inequality jointly appear more difficult to calculate and harder to 
communicate in their original forms. Hence, it is the simpler poverty measures that tend 
to be actually used despite their insensitivity towards distribution among the poor, 
which is considered important by Sen (1976); Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984); 
Shorrocks (1995); Lipton and Ravallion (1995), among others. 
In this paper, we analyse the benchmark poverty measures such as the Sen and SST 
indices of poverty intensity in order to (i) find their simplified representations, (ii) relate 
them to an illustrative tool called the poverty box, which combines the incidence and 
depth of poverty in a two-dimension space, and (iii) apply these measures to a 
developing country (China). Osberg and Xu (2000) find that in the developed countries, 
where the poverty rate is relatively low (typically considerably less than 20 per cent), 
inequality among the poor is small and fairly constant over time and across 
jurisdictions. Hence Osberg (2000) and Xu and Osberg (2000) advocate the poverty box 
approach as a way of simplifying communication and facilitating comparative studies.
8 
This approach offers a solution on how to measure poverty incidence and depth jointly 
and graphically, and gives the poverty gap ratio a geometric interpretation. This paper 
addresses the issue of whether the same should be done in developing countries such as 
China, where the poverty rate is much higher and the regional variations in inequality of 
poverty are greater. 
Section 2 of the paper reviews what we have learned from the literature on a set of 
useful poverty measures. Section 3 provides some empirical evidence from China. 
Section 4 concludes.  
 
                                                 
7   See Zheng (1997) for a review. 
8   Fields’ study (1977: 576 or 1980: 26 and 212) on Brazil’s poverty, includes a figure in which the 
poverty rate and average poverty gap in local currency are shown in a coordinate system, but for 
international comparison, one needs to use the poverty gap ratio. Based on international data in 1987 
and 1998, Chen and Ravallion (2001) note that the poverty rate based on the 1993 PPP US$ 1.08 (or 
1993 PPP US$2.15) poverty line, poverty rate is higher than 40 per cent (70 per cent) in South Asian 
and Sub-Saharan Africa.  
4 
2  What have we learned about poverty measurement?  
The most common measure of poverty is the proportion of the population whose 
incomes are below a designated poverty line. If we use N for the size of a population 





=    (2.1) 
This ‘headcount’ measure presupposes the definition of recipient unit (individual or 
family or household) and income concept, and the specification of a poverty line (z), 
below which the income of an individual i ( i y ) is unacceptably low. However, the 
poverty rate cannot show the depth of poverty—identical poverty rates in two countries 
or the same country at two different points in time will not convey any information on 
average income levels or shortfalls below the poverty lines. More disturbingly, if the 
poverty rate is used as the main measure of the effectiveness of anti-poverty policy, 
policymakers may be tempted by ‘cream-skimming’, because the most cost effective 
way to reduce poverty is to give a small transfer to the richest of the poor, in order to lift 
his or her income just above the poverty line.  
Concern with the depth of poverty motivates two closely related measures—the average 
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where the poverty gap ratio is set to zero for the nonpoor population because they have 
zero deprivation of income.  
These measures of the incidence and average depth of poverty cannot reveal whether 
deprivation differs substantially among poor people. Further, the average poverty gap 
ratios are not sensitive to whether poverty alleviation targets the poorest of the poor or 
those who are only marginally poor. In 1976 Amartya Sen proposed a set of 
fundamental axioms as the basis for poverty measurement9 which, although refined 
further later (see Shorrocks 1995; Chakravarty 1997), has formed the foundation for 
subsequent poverty measures. One of the key points made by Sen is that all the existing 
poverty measures at that time were insensitive to the distribution aspect of poverty.  
                                                 
9  Similar to the debate in establishing inequality measurement, where the Pigou-Dalton transfer 
principle became a guidepost or an axiom (see Dalton 1920 for the original work and Xu 2003 for an 
intuitive explanation).  
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The seven best known axioms or principles for evaluating poverty measures are:10 
i)  Focus Axiom (F): the poverty measure should be independent of the nonpoor 
population.  
ii)  Weak Monotonicity Axiom (WM): a reduction in a poor person’s income, 
holding other incomes constant, must increase the value of the poverty 
measure. 
iii)  Impartiality Axiom (I): A poverty measure should be insensitive to the order of 
incomes. 
iv)  Weak Transfer Axiom (WT): An increase in a poverty measure should occur if 
the poorer of the two individuals involved in an upward transfer of income is 
poor and if the set of poor people does not change. 
v)  Strong Upward Transfer Axiom (SUT): An increase in a poverty measure 
should occur if the poorer of the two individuals involved in an upward 
transfer of income is poor.  
vi)  Continuity Axiom (C): The poverty measure must vary continuously with 
incomes. 
vii)  Replication Invariance Axiom (RI): The value of a poverty measure does not 
change if it is computed based on an income distribution that is generated by 
the k-fold replication of an original income distribution. 
For some observers, these axioms or principles are pre-conditions to judge the 
reasonableness of a poverty measure. Of course, as shown later, some axioms impose 
stronger conditions than other axioms do (WT versus SUT or with or without C). 
The poverty rate H satisfies the Focus, Impartiality, and Replication Invariance axioms 
but it violates the Weak Monotonicity, and Weak Transfer axioms. Hence, many 
economists find the poverty rate unacceptable as a poverty index, since it captures the 
incidence of poverty but is insensitive to the depth of poverty. The average poverty gap 
ratio of the poor I satisfies the Focus, Weak Monotonicity, and Impartiality axioms but 
not the Weak Transfer axiom, which means that I captures the depth of poverty but is 
insensitive to the distribution aspect of poverty. Because of these deficiencies in the 
poverty rate and average poverty gap ratio, Sen (1976) proposes two versions of the 
same poverty measure. The first is  
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where  () p Gy  is the Gini index of the distribution of the poor. As the population size 






. Thus another version is given by  
(1 ) ( ) . p SH I I G y ⎡⎤ =+ − ⎣⎦  (2.5) 
                                                 
10 See Hagenaars (1986, 1991) or Xu and Osberg (2001) in Chinese; English version is available at 
www/economics.dal.ca/RePEc/dal/wparch/sensw.pdf.  
6 
These two versions of the Sen indices will satisfy the other axioms but not the Strong 
Upward Transfers and Continuity axioms.  0 S  does not satisfy the Replication 
Invariance axiom while S does. Clark, Hemmings and Ulph (1981) apply equation (2.5) 
in their empirical study. 
Shorrocks (1995) proposes a modified Sen index which is identical to the limiting case 
of the Thon index (1979, 1983), and can be called the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon (SST) index 
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is set to zero. The application of 
this poverty index can be found in Xu (1998). 
Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) propose a class of decomposable poverty indices 
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where y represents the income distribution and  i y  represents the income of individual i. 
Within this family of indices, the FGT index with some values of α ( 0,1 α = ) does not 
satisfy all of the above axioms. However, higher order FGT indices (i.e. α > 1) do 
satisfy Weak Monotonicity, Weak Transfer and Strong Upward Transfer axioms. As can 
be seen below, the FGT family of indices include some that are criticized by Sen (1976).  
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The FGT index of order 1 is the average poverty gap ratio of the population, which 
equals the product of the poverty rate and the average poverty gap ratio of the poor.  
FGT indices of an order higher than 1 are distribution-sensitive. For example, when 
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In this formulation, when α > 1, a larger poverty gap ratio  0
i zy
z
− ⎛⎞ > ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 receives more 
than proportionately higher weight in the FGT index. Schady (2002) is an example 
where the FGT index of order 2 is used. Researchers often face the question as to what 
value should be assigned to α. It is unclear how to weight each of the FGT indices in 
terms of relative importance. This family of indices itself does not provide any guidance 
on this issue. However, as Osberg (2004) notes, in the FGT family of indices, when the 
Luxembourg Income Study data on affluent countries are used, it appears that over the 
range α = 2, 3, …, 6 index values tend to be clustered and there is not much additional 
gain of information. We consider below whether a similar conclusion is warranted in the 
very different circumstances of rural China.  
It is somewhat surprising to see that the FGT indices are applied more widely in 
empirical poverty studies than the Sen indices,  0 S , S , and  SST S , although the latter were 
proposed earlier and have been improved upon over time (see Osberg 2004). Fields 
(1980: 170) notes that it is sometimes impossible to calculate S because of the 
unavailability of data on income inequality. Although the FGT index of order α < 2 does 
not satisfy many of the important axioms, the FGT indices are considered attractive by 
many analysts, in particular for their additive subgroup decomposability. Osberg and Xu 
(1999, 2000); Osberg (2000); and Xu and Osberg (2001, 2002) argue that the Sen 
indices may not seem as simple to the policy analysts, but should and can be 
substantially simplified. Indeed, as soon as these simplifications become known, the Sen 
indices, in particular the SST index, become a powerful tool in policy analysis as shown 
by Myles and Picot (2000).  
In particular, we have argued11 that the Sen index S and the SST index  SST S  (given in 
equations (2.5) and (2.6) respectively) should, and can, be simplified into their 
multiplicative components - the poverty rate, average poverty gap ratio of the poor, and 
a measure that is related to the Gini index of poverty gap ratios of the poor (for the Sen 
index) or of the population (for the SST index).  





 for the poor and x those of the 
population. The Sen index given in equation (2.5) can be written as 
1( ) . p SH I G x ⎡⎤ =+ ⎣⎦  (2.11) 
Note that in order to calculate  ( ) p Gx , one can use the regular Gini index formula12 with 
                                                 
11  See Osberg and Xu (1999, 2001); Osberg (2000), and Xu and Osberg (2001, 2002). 
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, where  12 {, , , } N y yy K do not have to be sorted. Note that  y  
is the mean of  12 {, , , } N y yy K . See Xu (2003) for more details.  
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poverty gap ratios sorted in non-decreasing order (see Xu and Osberg 2002: 143). The 
higher is the value of 1 ( ) p Gx + , the greater is inequality among the poor. A verbal 
expression of equation (2.11) above is: 
The Sen index = [the poverty rate]×[the average poverty gap ratio of the poor] 
  X[the inequality of poverty gap ratios of the poor].  
The interpretation of the above is that the Sen index measures poverty incidence, depth 
and inequality jointly while permitting decomposition into commonly used poverty 
measures. Poverty is high when the incidence of poverty is high (a higher poverty rate), 
or when the depth of poverty is increasing (a higher average poverty gap ratio), and or 
when the poverty gap ratios of the poor are more unequal [a higher 1( ) p Gx + ]. When 
poverty gap ratios of the poor are identical, then the Sen index becomes:  
The Sen index = [the poverty rate] X[the average poverty gap ratio of the poor]  
because the poor are approximately equally deprived,  ( ) 0 p Gx = , so 1 ( ) 1 p Gx += . The 
Sen index thus collapses to the FGT index, with α = 1. As well, when the inequality of 
poverty gap ratios is a constant, the major sources of changes in poverty can be 
expressed as the sum of changes in the poverty rate and the average poverty gap ratio of 
the poor alone. Hence, when either when the inequality of poverty is constant or 
changes little, the combination of two simple concepts—the rate and average depth of 
poverty—would be sufficient from a comparative analysis (over time or across 
countries/regions/social groups). This leads to a powerful illustrative tool: the poverty 
box. Under the same condition, the size of poverty box can represent the welfare loss 
caused by poverty and the change in the box size can be interpreted as the change in 
welfare loss. 
The poverty box is, in fact, related to the poverty profile (originally due to Jenkins and 
Lambert 1997), which we show in Figure 1. In this coordinate system, the poverty 
profile draws the curve of cumulative percentage of poverty gap ratios, for the total 
population, from the highest to the lowest (zero ratio for the nonpoor) corresponding to 
the percentage of the population. The poverty profile curve rises from the origin (at 
point 0) at a faster rate, increases at a decreasing rate, reaches a plateau (at point a) 
when the last and least poor individual’s poverty gap ratio is added, and then becomes 
flat to the end (at point HI) when zero poverty gap ratios of the nonpoor are add to the 
cumulative percentage. When the inequality of poverty gap ratios is nil, the curved 
segment of the poverty profile becomes a straight line.  
As shown in Figure 2, the geometric interpretation of the Sen index with reference to 
the poverty profile curve according to Xu and Osberg (2002), is as shown in the upper-
right panel. Let the triangle area of OHH’ be Area E. The Sen index is given by the sum 
of Areas C and D divided by Area E. Hence the Sen index will take the curvature (in 
relation to Area C) into account. In the lower-left panel of Figure 2, the poverty box is 
drawn in relation to the poverty profile. In the event that there is no curvature in the 
poverty profile curve or when the curved segment varies little in a relative sense, the 
poverty box can convey all the information needed for poverty comparisons.   
9 
Figure 1 






                                                             





Source:  Xu and Osberg (2002). 
 
Figure 2  






                                                              





Source:  Xu and Osberg (2002). 
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As shown in Osberg and Xu (1999, 2000), the SST index (equation (2.6)) proposed by 
Shorrocks (1995) following Sen (1976), can be simplified into  
(1 ( )), SST SH I G x =+  (2.12) 
where x represents the poverty gap ratios of the total population. A less mathematical 
expression of the above is 
The SST Index = [the poverty rate]×[the average poverty gap ratio of the poor] × 
  [the inequality of poverty gap ratios of the population]. 
As shown previously for the Sen index, the SST index also measures the welfare loss 
caused by poverty and it can measure poverty incidence, depth and inequality jointly 
while permitting the SST index to be decomposed into commonly used poverty 
measures. The difference between the Sen and SST indices is the Gini index of poverty 
gap ratios. Unlike  ( ) p Gx which is in the Sen index and can take value zero when all the 
poor are equally poor—i.e., have the same poverty gap ratio,  ( ) Gx, which is in the SST 
index, cannot be zero simply because even if the poor are equally poor, the nonpoor 
have zero poverty gap ratios. As shown in Xu and Osberg (2002: 145: Equation 24), 
() 1 Gx H =− when the poor have an identical poverty gap ratio. For example, if the 
poverty rate is 15 per cent and the poor are equally poor, the Gini index of poverty gap 
ratios of the population will be 1-0.15 = 0.85. The inequality component in the SST 
index will then be 1 ( ) 1 0.85 1.85 Gx += + = . Any inequality in poverty gap ratios among 
the poor will add to [1 + G(x)] but with an upper bound value 2—so there is a fairly 
narrow possible range, particularly if the poverty rate is relatively low.  
The ‘common sense’ explanation for the small role that inequality among the poor plays 
in an aggregate measure of poverty intensity is that the differences in income among the 
poor are relatively small when compared to income differences among the nonpoor. The 
upper bound on the incomes of poor people is the poverty line. The lower bound, 
leaving measurement error aside, is subsistence. The money value of the difference is 
not large, particularly when compared to the differences in income observed among the 
nonpoor population.  
When the inequality of poverty gap ratios of the population changes little over time and 
across countries/regions/social groups, the value of the SST index is in proportion to 
(∝) the product of the poverty rate and the average poverty gap ratio of the poor; that is 
The SST Index ∝ [the poverty rate]×[the average poverty gap ratio of the poor]. 
To a logarithmic approximation, the percentage change in the SST Index is then equal to 
the sum of the percentage changes in the poverty rate and the average poverty gap ratio 
of the poor.  
The geometric interpretation of the SST index, according to Xu and Osberg (2002) is as 
follows. Let the lower triangle of the poverty profile box in the upper-right panel of 
Figure 2 be surrounded by O, O’, HI, 1, and H be Area A, which is the half of the unit  
11 
box. The SST index is the ratio of the sum of Areas B, C, and D to Area A. Hence, the 
poverty box is directly connected to the poverty profile. 
Figure 3 
The poverty box for the United Kingdom in 1974, 1979, 1986, 1991 and 1995 
 



























Source: Osberg  (2004). 
For both Sen and SST indices,13 it appears that the inequality of the poor in developed 
countries is fairly constant, and thus plays little role in comparisons—either 
internationally or over time (Osberg and Xu (2000). Hence a two-dimensional poverty 
box can present poverty reasonably accurately and can be used for across 
country/region/social group comparisons. The poverty box is formed by the poverty rate 
H and the average poverty gap ratio of the poor I (see Xu and Osberg 2001 and Osberg 
2004).  
Why is the poverty box a useful analytical and illustration tool? Figure 3 illustrates its 
potential usefulness for comparisons of poverty in the context of the United Kingdom 
(see Osberg 2004), where the average poverty gap ratio and the poverty rate moved in 
different directions over time. An assessment of poverty policy in the UK which looked 
only at the poverty rate would score the 1979 to 1986 period as a success, since the 
poverty rate fell (from 9 per cent to 8.4 per cent), but would miss completely the 
significant increase in the average poverty gap of the poor (which rose from 21.8 per 
cent of the poverty line to 27.8 per cent). This divergence between trends in the poverty 
                                                 
13  The Sen and SST indices are closely related. According to Xu and Osberg (2002): 
2( 1 ) . SST SH S H H I =+ −   
   That is, given H and I , it is always possible to compute  SST S  from S and vice versa. For example, if 
we know  SST S , H, and I based on the data, we can compute S using 
  2( 1 )
2(1 ) .




== − −    
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rate and average poverty gap ratio is not uncommon in developed nations (see Osberg 
2002: 18), but is crucial for the assessment of poverty policy ‘success’. If there is little 
change in inequality among the poor, the poverty box represents the welfare loss clearly 
and is precisely the poverty gap ratio index (H×I) advocated by the United Nations as 
the secondary indicator of poverty. Having established the link between the poverty box 
and the Sen and SST indices, the remaining question for this paper is whether or not the 
poverty box approach can be effectively used in analysing poverty in developing 
countries—and to assess this issue we turn to evidence from China.  
3  How should we measure poverty trends in China?  
In assessing the level and trend of global poverty, a crucial variable is the rate of growth 
of the Chinese economy. With 1.29 billion citizens, roughly 20 per cent of the world’s 
population, China dominates global poverty trends in Asia and the world—and in recent 
years, the Chinese economy has been growing strongly.14 In 1980, GDP per capita in 
China was US$708 (PPP, constant 1995 international dollars),15 but by 2003 that had 
risen six-fold to US$4,344.16 Over the 1995-2003 period, the average annual growth 
rate of per capita GDP was 7.55 per cent. Extrapolation of these recent trends would 
imply that in 2023, per capita GDP in China would be about US$20,000 in 1995 PPP 
terms—a level of income that is well above the income levels in Europe at the time 
when a ‘relative income’ conception of poverty became recognized as appropriate.17  
At current exchange rates, the US dollar value of China’s per capita GDP is far lower—
at US$1,024 in 2003. Clearly, when the ratio between PPP and the exchange rate is of 
the order of 4:1, adjustment for PPP has an enormous impact on the estimated level of 
average real income of 1.29 billion people. In fact, the calculation of PPP values can be 
done in a number of ways—each with its own advantages and disadvantages. Hill 
(2000: 294) compares the range of estimates of PPP adjusted average income levels that 
thirteen available methodologies imply, noting that calculated average income ratios can 
nearly double, depending on the PPP methodology chosen.18 Hence, one has to worry 
that estimates of the extent of global poverty are extremely sensitive to very technical 
choices about the PPP methodology. Because the income distribution is typically very 
dense in the region of the poverty line, even small changes in the calculation of the 
poverty line can affect the measured poverty status of fairly large fractions of the 
                                                 
14  India’s 1.06 billion inhabitants, faster rate of population growth, and lower level of average income 
(GDP per capita of US$2529 in 2003—PPP constant 1995 international dollars) mean that India’s 
growth rate is also crucial to global poverty trends: between 1995 and 2003, growth in GDP per capita 
in India averaged 4.3 per cent, with strong acceleration in most recent years (8 per cent GDP growth 
in 2003).   
15 Unless otherwise noted, all aggregate data in this section are based on the PPP constant 1995 dollars, 
drawn from the World Bank website, available at:  www//devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/. 
16 To put this in context, the comparable per capita GDP of Portugal in 1975 was US$7,499. 
17 The GDP per capita (PPP, constant 1995 international dollars) of Canada was US$23,842 in 2003. 
18 For example, although (when evaluated at observed exchange rates) the ratio of per capita income in 
the USA in 1990 to that of Turkey was 8.1 to 1, the range of PPP income ratios was between 3.3 to 1 
and 6.4 to 1 (with the Geary-Khamis price index method favoured by the ICP project generating a 
ratio of 3.7 to 1). See Hill (2000).   
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population. The technical uncertainties involved in PPP calculations, and their 
enormous impact on poverty measurements, are a strong argument for the use of a 
relative income criterion of the poverty line, measured in own currency units—on the 
grounds of transparency and robustness. As well, developing countries such as China 
are moving rapidly from the group of nations in which absolute poverty is the key 
concern to the group of countries in which relative poverty will be in the spotlight. 
While it is still possible to continue to calculate the absolute US$1 per day poverty line, 
the concept of relative poverty is becoming steadily more socially relevant.  
The usual methodology for international comparisons of poverty among developed 
countries is to use microdata on the incomes of individual households (from a dataset 
such as the Luxembourg Income Study) in order to calculate the equivalent income of 
individuals and to draw the poverty line relative to median equivalent income—most 
commonly at 50 per cent of median individual equivalent income. Typically, all 
individuals within households are assumed to share equally in household resources, and 
have no claim on the resources of other households.
19 The LIS definition of total family 
money income after tax (disposable income)
20 is often used as the basis for calculation 
of the after-tax money ‘equivalent income’ of all individuals within families. The 
concept of equivalent income is used to reflect the fact that members of larger 
households can benefit from economies of scale in their consumption expenditure. In 
the literature, a number of equivalence scales have been used to account for the 
economies of scale of household consumption (see Burkhauser, Smeeding and Merz 
1996, and Phipps and Garner 1994, among others) but recent literature
21 has 
predominantly used the LIS equivalence scale, which calculates the equivalent income 








=  (3.1) 
where  f y  is total household income after tax,
22 and  f n  is the number of persons in the 
household.23 
                                                 
19 Admittedly, these are strong assumptions about the social context of income flows since the effective 
resources available to each person depend on the degree of inequality in the intra-household 
distribution of consumption. See Phipps and Burton (1995: 194). 
20 Disposable income consists of the sum of gross wages and salaries, farm self-employment income, 
nonfarm self-employment income, cash property income, sick pay, disability pay, social retirement 
benefits, child or family allowances, unemployment compensation, maternity pay, 
military/veteran/war benefits, other social insurance, means-tested cash benefits, near cash benefits, 
private pensions, public sector pensions, alimony or child support, other regular private income, and 
other cash benefits; minus mandatory contributions for self employed, mandatory employee 
contribution, and income tax. 
21 See, for example, Buhmann et al. (1988), Coulter, Cowell and Jenkins (1992), Burkhauser, Smeeding 
and Merz (1996), and Figini (1998) for comparison of the LIS, OECD and other equivalence scales. 
Figini (1998: 2) notes that ‘OECD and other two-parameter equivalence scales empirically used show 
a similarity of results (in measurement of inequality) to one parameter equivalence scales with 
elasticity around 0.5’. 
22 ‘Disposable personal income’ in the LIS datasets.  
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This methodology lies behind the poverty estimates for the UK discussed in section 2 
(and much of the broader literature on poverty in affluent nations), but this paper started 
with a discussion of global poverty trends using an absolute poverty line concept 
(specified as the local currency equivalent, in purchasing power parity terms, of US$1 
per day). How does the relative poverty line methodology compare with the absolute 
US$1 standard for China in 1995?  
To assess this, we use data from the 1995 Chinese Household Income Project (1995 
CHIP)24 whose purpose was to measure and estimate the distribution of personal 
income in both rural and urban areas of the People’s Republic of China. The concept of 
‘income’ used was considerably broader than that used in most studies of OECD 
nations. It included both cash payments and a broad range of additional components: 
payments in kind valued at market prices, agricultural output produced for self-
consumption valued at market prices, the value of food and other direct subsidies, and 
the imputed value of housing services.25/26 Although calculation of the value of in-kind 
or own account self-production is arguably an appropriate adjustment to the context of 
rural China, none of the nations whose data are included in the LIS makes an imputation 
of the rental value of owner-occupied housing.27 Thus, maintaining a comparable 
estimate of poverty implies similarly disregarding the imputed value of housing 
services. 
The 1995 CHIP dataset is based on a survey of 7,998 rural households (representing 
together 34,739 individual household members) in 19 provinces plus 6,931 urban 
households (with 21,698 members) in 11 provinces. Eliminating observations with 
negative incomes produces 7,988 rural and 6,929 urban households. Table 1 presents 
estimates, based on one-half the median equivalent income (in local currency) as the 
poverty line, of the SST index, poverty rate, average poverty gap ratio, and inequality of 
poverty gap ratios. The top panel uses the comprehensive definition of income, while 
the bottom panel excludes the imputed value of owner-occupied housing. 
                                                                                                                                               






α =  .Household income 
is assigned to each individual if α = 0 and per capita income is assigned if α = 1. 
24 See Riskin, Renwei, and Shi (2000). The CHIP is a joint research effort sponsored by the Institute of 
Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Asian Development Bank and the Ford 
Foundation. Additional support was provided by the East Asian Institute, Columbia University. 
25 Disposable rural household income = income from wage pensions and other compensations received 
by individual members of the household + household income from township, village, collective and 
other types of enterprise (other than compensation for labour) + cash income from farming and 
industrial and subsidiary activities + gross value of self-consumption of farm products + income from 
property + rental value of housing equity + net transfer from/to collective and state entities 
  + miscellaneous income (including private transfers) + net cash income from the sale of farm 
products + net income from nonfarm subsidiary activities. 
26 Disposable urban household income = cash income of the working members + income of the retired 
members + income of the non-working members + income from private/individual enterprises + 
income from property + miscellaneous income (including private transfers and special income) 
 + subsidies less taxes (except housing subsidy and ration coupon subsidy) and income in-kind + 
ration coupon subsidy + housing subsidy + rental value of owner occupied housing equity. 
27 The method used in the 1995 CHIP is to assume an 8 per cent return on the respondent-estimated 
value of home equity.  
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Table 1 
SST and components, China 1995 






























































































































Income: includes imputed return 
owner-occupied housing 
   
All 2555  0.100  0.189  0.282  1.886  2474 
Urban 2555  0.0063  0.014 0.225  1.993  94 
Rural 2555  0.154  0.298  0.283  1.818  2380 
Income: 
excludes home wealth 
      
All 2289  0.118  0.204  0.309  1.875  2677 
Urban 2289  0.0065  0.013 0.255  1.993  86 
Rural 2289  0.180  0.323  0.310  1.801  2591 
Source:  Calculated by the authors. 
If the comprehensive definition of income is adopted, then half the median equivalent 
income is 2,555 yuan (Renminbi). At the official exchange rate of 8.28 yuan per US$1, 
this is equivalent to a poverty line of US$308.57, or US$0.85 per day. However, 
excluding the imputed value of owner-occupied housing implies that half the median 
income is 2,289 yuan, which is equivalent to US$276.44 per year (US$ 0.76 per day) at 
official exchange rates. Clearly, however, the official exchange rate is a poor guide to 
relative purchasing power. If the PPP exchange rate is 1.9 yuan per US$1,28 this implies 
that calculating a relative poverty line of half the median equivalent income produces a 
poverty line equivalent to US$1,344 per year (US$3.68 per day) using the 
comprehensive income concept, or US$1,204 per year (US$3.30 per day) excluding the 
imputed value of home ownership. In 1995, therefore, a relative poverty line would be 
set substantially above the US$1 or US$2 absolute standard.  
Of course, if incomes at the bottom end of the income distribution in China were to 
have grown over the period 1995 to 2003 at the same 7.55 per cent rate as per capita 
GDP, a person earning US$1 in 1995 would be making US$1.83 in 2003, and someone 
making US$2 per day in 1995 would make US$3.66 in 2003. Hence, a relative poverty 
line of one half median equivalent income in 1995 is, in absolute terms, about what 
somebody who was just at the US$2 per day income level in 1995 would now be 
making, if their incomes had grown at the national average rate—which implies that in 
China in 2003 a relative poverty line may not actually have been so different from an 
absolute (US$2 per day) poverty line, in practice. Of course, one clear concern about 
the path of China’s development is precisely this assumption—that people at the bottom 
of the income distribution are sharing in the benefits of economic growth.29 
                                                 
28 See World Bank (2003: 282-5). 
29 Gustafsson and Zhong (2000) similarly adopt one-half of median equivalent disposable income as 
poverty line in 1988, but they update to 1995 using only consumer price inflation. Using this fixed 
poverty line, they find the impact of aggregate growth on poverty to be more than offset by rising 
inequality—leaving demographic change as the cause of the slight decline in poverty.  
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Implicitly, the use of a common national poverty line criterion for poverty measurement 
in developed countries is based on the idea that the nation as a whole is the relevant 
comparison group for the assessment of interpersonal equity. The motivation for this 
idea is not really a sociological presumption that individuals in all parts of the nation 
actually compare themselves with each other—survey evidence indicates that 
interpersonal comparisons tend to be highly local in all countries,30 and China is the 
world’s largest. However, the nation-state is the political entity within which 
redistribution of income, or other forms of antipoverty policy might conceivably occur, 
and it is the political unit within which any expressions of political discontent with 
poverty outcomes will primarily be managed. 
If a common national poverty line is used, one clear implication of Table 1 is the 
concentration of poverty in China in rural areas. Focussing on the lower panel of 
Table 1, we see that by this definition of the poverty line, the SST index of poverty in 
urban areas is approximately 18 times larger in rural areas than in urban China (0.1180 
compared to 0.0065)—not primarily because the depth of poverty in rural areas is so 
much greater (the average rural poverty gap is 0.309, compared to an average urban 
poverty gap of 0.255) but because the rate of poverty is so very much higher (32.3 per 
cent in rural areas, compared to just 1.3 per cent in urban areas). The poverty box for the 
information in Table 1 is given in Figure 4. As can be seen in Figure 4, the divide 
between rural and urban China is huge. 
Table 2 shows that if rural and urban China are analysed separately, i.e., the urban 
poverty line is drawn at half the median equivalent income of urban areas, and the rural 
poverty line is drawn at half the median equivalent income of rural areas, the poverty  
 
Figure 4  






































Poverty line = 1/2 median for country 
                                                 
30  See Kluegel et al. (1995: 20) or Evans and Kelley (2003).  
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line would be set over twice as high in urban areas (3,862 yuan) as in rural China (1,527 
yuan). Interestingly, the level of poverty in rural China would still be twice as high as in 
urban areas (a rural SST index of 0.072 compared to an urban index of 0.036). This is 
again illustrated clearly in Figure 5, which shows the differences between the poverty 
box between rural and urban China when each is evaluated by its own poverty 
standards. 
However, since the CHIP data go to some lengths to account for possible sources of in-
kind income that might reduce the money cost of living in rural areas, there seems to be 
little technical reason why rural and urban incomes cannot be compared. If Chinese 
 
Table 2 
SST and components, China 1995 
 






























































































































Income: includes imputed return 
owner-occupied housing 
   
Urban 4159  0.033  0.073 0.230  1.958 494 
Rural 1753  0.057  0.120  0.245  1.931  974 
Income: 
excludes home wealth 
      
Urban 3862  0.036  0.076 0.238  1.956 515 
Rural 1527  0.072  0.133  0.281  1.924  1084 
Source:  Calculated by the authors. 
Figure 5  
The poverty box for China, 1995: urban and rural comparison 






































Source: Based on the authors’ calculations.  
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society comprises a common polity, the application of a common national poverty line 
to both urban and rural China therefore seems defensible. Thus, Table 3 compares the 
SST index of poverty across the rural areas of the sampled provinces of China. Even 
leaving aside the capital region Beijing, because of its absolutely low fraction of rural 
dwellers, there is a huge range of variation in the SST index of poverty intensity—with 
large differences across provinces in all three components of the SST index. As Table 3 
indicates, the rural poverty rate (excluding Beijing) is as high as 61.9 per cent and as 
low as 9.7 per cent. The average rural poverty gap ranges from about 38.9 per cent to 
about 7 per cent of the poverty line. These differences—of the order of a 5:1 ratio—are 
huge, so large as to swamp the observed differences in inequality of the poverty gap in 
the population—which varies between 1.567 and 1.962. The variations in (1+G(x)) 
across the rural areas of Chinese provinces are relatively large compared to the variation 
observed across other datasets in developed countries, but small compared to the 
variation in poverty rate or poverty gap—which may indicate the usefulness of the 
poverty box emphasis on poverty incidence and depth of poverty. 
Since one of the purposes of poverty measurement is to rank the severity of the problem 
of poverty in different jurisdictions, one can ask to what extent using the ‘normalized 
poverty gap’ (FGT1) or poverty box concept
31 will alter the ranking of rural poverty  
among Chinese provinces based on the SST index and to what extent using higher order 
Table 3 
SST and components, rural China 1995 by province 






























































































































11 - Beijing  2289  0.023  0.021  0.558  1.985  2 
13 - Hebei  2289  0.184  0.312  0.328  1.801  159 
14 - Shanxi  2289  0.342  0.559  0.373  1.643  166 
21 - Liaoning  2289  0.166  0.288  0.316  1.820  92 
22 - Jilin  2289  0.146  0.253  0.312  1.848  75 
32 - Jiangsu  2289  0.303  0.220  0.070  1.962  36 
33 - Zhejiang  2289  0.052  0.129  0.210  1.918  53 
34 - Anhui  2289  0.117  0.247  0.256  1.853  112 
36 - Jiangxi  2289  0.108  0.252  0.231  1.852  88 
37 - Shandong  2289  0.142  0.249  0.307  1.850  178 
41 - Henan  2289  0.129  0.271  0.258  1.847  203 
42 - Hubei  2289  0.194  0.279  0.381  1.828  111 
43 - Hunan  2289  0.229  0.412  0.319  1.741  204 
44 - Guangdong  2289  0.059 0.097 0.310 1.946  46 
51 - Sichuan  2289  0.248  0.485  0.301  1.697  388 
52 - Guizhou  2289  0.272  0.547  0.301  1.657  165 
53 - Yunnan  2289  0.215  0.472  0.268  1.701  146 
61 - Shanxi  2289  0.308  0.578  0.328  1.625  177 
62 - Gansu  2289  0.378 0.619 0.389 1.567  190 
Source:  Calculated by the authors. 
                                                 
31 Although the FGT1 does not satisfy the transfer axiom, it does possess the socially desirable property 
of easy comprehensibility and subgroup decomposability and is equal to the area of the poverty box.  
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FGT indices would alter the ranking based on the SST index. As noted earlier, in 
equation (2.7), the Sen and SST indices are well justified poverty measures which 
contain, as their components, both the FGT index of order—the poverty rate (H)—and 
the FGT index of order 1—the average poverty gap of poor people (I)—times the 
poverty rate (H). 
Table 4 reports the computed level of rural poverty for each region/province of China 
for which data are available in the CHIP, using as measure the SST index and FGT α 
= 0…6. One way of evaluating the loss of information entailed by using the poverty box 
is to see how much the ranking of the provinces based on the SST index is altered by 
using the poverty box (the poverty rate times poverty gap or FGT(1). Similarly, one way 
of thinking about how much the FGT index of a higher order (i.e., FGTα when  1 α > ) 
matters relative to the benchmark SST index is to see how much the poverty ranking of 
the provinces based on the SST index can be altered by the FGT index of a higher order 
( 1 α > ). As explained previously, the FGT index of a higher order can be interpreted as 
giving larger poverty gaps higher weights in the weighted sum in the FGT index so as to 
incorporate more aversion to poverty inequality.  
Table 4 
Comparison: SST and components versus FGT indices of order 1 to 6 
Rural China 1995 by provinces 
Poverty line = 1/2 the median for the country (including urban) 
Income excludes home wealth 
























































































11 - Beijing  0.021  0.558  0.023  0.0085  0.0067 0.0053 0.0042 0.0034 0.012 
13 - Hebei  0.312  0.328  0.184  0.0472  0.0254 0.0152 0.0099 0.0070 0.102 
14 - Shanxi  0.559  0.373  0.342  0.1094  0.0687 0.0479 0.0355 0.0274 0.209 
21 - Liaoning  0.288  0.316  0.166  0.0415  0.0224 0.0134 0.0085 0.0056 0.091 
22 - Jilin  0.253  0.312  0.146  0.0371  0.0213 0.0139 0.0098 0.0074 0.079 
32 - Jianhsu  0.070  0.220  0.303  0.0060  0.0031 0.0019 0.0012 0.0008 0.015 
33 - Zhejiang  0.129  0.210  0.052  0.0081  0.0029 0.0012 0.0005 0.0002 0.027 
34 - Anhui  0.247  0.256  0.117  0.0247  0.0117 0.0062 0.0036 0.0022 0.063 
36 - Jiangxi  0.252  0.231  0.108  0.0209  0.0094 0.0050 0.0030 0.0020 0.058 
37 - Shandong  0.249  0.307  0.142  0.0359 0.0212 0.0145 0.0109 0.0087 0.076 
41 - Henan  0.271  0.258  0.129  0.0297  0.0164 0.0105 0.0075 0.0057 0.070 
42 - Hubei  0.279  0.381  0.194  0.0586  0.0374 0.0258 0.0188 0.0141 0.106 
43 - Hunan  0.412  0.319  0.229  0.0597  0.0318 0.0187 0.0118 0.0079 0.131 
44 - Guangdong  0.097  0.310  0.059  0.0155 0.0099 0.0071 0.0055 0.0045 0.030 
51 - Sichuan  0.485  0.301  0.248  0.0636  0.0338 0.0206 0.0138 0.0100 0.146 
52 - Guizhou  0.547  0.301  0.272  0.0710  0.0368 0.0217 0.0142 0.0101 0.165 
53 - Yunnan  0.472  0.266  0.215  0.0485  0.0230 0.0127 0.0079 0.0054 0.125 
61 - Shanxi  0.578  0.328  0.308  0.0849  0.0460 0.0275 0.0179 0.0123 0.190 
62 - Gansu  0.619  0.389  0.378  0.1204 0.0695 0.0444 0.0305 0.0221 0.241 
Minimum  0.021 0.210 0.023 0.0060  0.0029 0.0012 0.0005 0.0002 0.012 
Maximum    0.619 0.558 0.378 0.1204  0.0695 0.0479 0.0355 0.0274 0.241 
Source:  Calculated by the authors. 
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For many purposes it is not so much the absolute level, but rather the comparative level, 
of a poverty index that matters. For example, in allocating funds for development 
purposes, one might want to know which Chinese province has the severest rural 
poverty. Since the various poverty indices discussed thus far have different ranges, it is 
not very useful to compare their numeric value, so this paper adopts the ‘linear scaling 
technique’ (LST) to standardize the range of all poverty measures. To do this, the high 
and low observed values are taken to represent the possible range of a poverty measure 
for all countries, and denoted min and max, respectively. The data are then scaled 
according to these values. Figure 6 then reports for each province32 the value for each 
poverty index scaled according to the formula () ( ) min / max min . value−−   
Figure 6 indicates that the ranking of the provinces based on the poverty rate is 
sometimes very different from the ranking based on the benchmark SST index (e.g., the 
province of Yunnan). However, the ranking of the provinces based on the poverty box is 
consistent with the ranking based on the benchmark SST index, which indicates that the 
poverty box is a good approximation of the benchmark SST index.
33 The FGT indices 
of order higher than 2 give increasing weights to inequality in poverty and hence may 
change the ranking of provinces based on the benchmark SST index substantially, in 
particular among the middle ranked provinces. A case in point again is Yunnan 
(code 53), which has the most prominent decline in ranking if the order of the FGT 
 
Figure 6  
Comparison of poverty rate, SST index and FGT index 
Rural China 1995 by province 
Poverty line = 1/2 the median for the country (including urban) 
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Source:  Based on the authors’ calculations. 
                                                 
32 More exactly, Figure 6 presents the data for provinces included in the CHIP data with 50 or more poor 
observations.  
33 Although this paper does not report the ranking based on the Sen index, it is shown in Footnote 14 of 
this paper that when I and H are known, the Sen index and SST index have a one-to-one 
correspondence relationship. Hence, both Sen and SST indices can be used as benchmarks.  
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index is increased. Yunnan province ranks 7th in poverty intensity based on both the 
SST index and poverty box. But as the order of the FGT index increases from 2 to 6, 
Yunnan experiences a rapid decline in the poverty ranking to the 8th, 9th, 11th, 11th, 
and 13th, respectively. However, for the most poverty-stricken provinces such as Gansu 
(code 62) and Shanxi (code 14) and the least poverty-stricken provinces such as 
Zhejiang (code 33) and Jiangxi (code 36), the higher order FGT indices do not provide 
any additional information in terms of relative rankings to those based on the 
benchmark SST index. Hence, Figure 6 can be read as indicating that there is relatively 
little gained in inter-provincial poverty comparisons if one uses ‘higher order’ [FGT α = 
2…6 ] poverty indices. 
4  Summary and conclusion 
This paper started by asking whether the estimated proportion of the world’s population 
with income below US$1 (adjusted according to PPP) per day is a good measure of 
trends in global poverty. We have argued that the answer depends on two important 
issues in the measurement of poverty—the definition of the poverty line, and how best 
to summarize the level of poverty.  
4.1  What poverty line? 
In common language usage, poverty is about deprivation of necessities; the primary 
dictionary definition of ‘poverty’ is the deprivation of ‘the necessities of life’ (see 
Oxford 1998: 1135). Adam Smith’s views on this were drafted at a time—more than 
200 years ago—when all nations had much lower incomes than presently, but their 
relevance endures: 
Under necessaries, therefore, I comprehend not only those things which nature, 
but those things which the established rules of decency have rendered 
necessary to the lowest rank of people. (Vol. 2, Bk. V, Ch. II, Pt II, Art IV—
1961: 400) 
In thinking about what ‘the established rules of decency’ might be, on a global scale, the 
criterion of US$1 per day—US$, PPP—has the enormous virtue of seeming simplicity, 
and hence communicability to a global public. However, a good deal of technical 
complexity sits behind the calculation of US$1 per day in purchasing power parity 
terms—and the issue is crucial to the evaluation of the level of global poverty.  
As well, the rapidity of economic growth in China, and in India and South East Asia, 
means that for a very substantial fraction of the world’s population, the problem of 
absolute deprivation of commodities is being replaced by a more subtle type of poverty. 
As Sen (1992: 115) puts it: 
Relative deprivation in the space of incomes can yield absolute deprivation in 
the space of capabilities. In a country that is generally rich, more income may 
be needed to buy enough commodities to achieve the same social functioning, 
such as ‘appearing in public without shame’. The same applies to the capability 
of ‘taking part the life of the community’.  
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In international poverty comparisons among developed countries, the norm is to 
calculate the poverty line as a fraction of median income, and to use local currency units 
throughout, which avoids entirely the problem of the uncertain value of PPP 
conversions. For the above reasons, this paper argues that more attention should be 
given to relative deprivation (i.e., equivalent incomes less than half the median) as well 
as absolute deprivation (i.e., incomes below US$1 or $2 per day). 
4.2  The summarization of poverty outcomes 
The Sen and SST indices of poverty intensity measure the welfare loss caused by the 
incidence, depth and inequality of poverty, have desirable axiomatic properties and can 
be calculated and decomposed easily. Furthermore, they have simple geometric 
interpretations that are related directly to an easily communicated illustrative tool, the 
poverty box. As demonstrated in the empirical example in this paper, the poverty 
ranking of regions based on the poverty box is remarkably consistent with that based on 
the benchmark SST index, which has a one-to-one correspondence relationship with the 
Sen index. The ‘higher order’ poverty FGT indices (FGT α = 2…6) do not change the 
rankings of most and least poverty-stricken provinces but will shift the middle range 
regions primarily due to the overweighting of inequality in poverty. Hence, in addition 
to being subject to arbitrariness in selecting the order, α = 2…6, the higher order FGT 
indices add relatively little to comparisons among jurisdictions, whether in comparisons 
of rural poverty in China, or of affluent nations. Hence, the poverty box is indeed 
appealing as a useful illustrative tool for poverty analysis—particularly since it 
represents two major components of the Sen and SST indices and is equivalent to the 
FGT index of order 1 (the poverty rate and the poverty gap ratio of the poor or simply 
poverty rate and gap. We argue that poverty rate and gap should be the primary target 
UN Millennium Development target and should receive more attention.  
When we apply our poverty box and the SST index to the Chinese data, our results 
confirm the huge urban-rural divide in the incidence, depth and inequality of poverty. 
As 1.3 billion Chinese try to modernize their economy in a period of a few decades, the 
rural/urban divide is huge. Although rapid economic growth has eliminated absolute 
poverty in some parts of Asia, there remains much to be done for rural China. 
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